The Resurgence of The M23 : Regional Rivalries, Donor Policy, and a Stalled Peace Process

This report by Ebuteli and the Congo Research Group (CRG), entitled The Resurgence of the M23 : Regional Rivalries, Donor Policy, and a Stalled peace Process, asserts that the causes of the resurgence of the M23 rebellion are mainly external to the DRC.

In November 2021, the M23 rebellion resurfaced after being relatively dormant since 2013. With the support of Rwanda, they now occupy large swathes of North Kivu province, including several major towns, and have caused the displacement of over 1.7 million people.

Our report argues that the most important factor in the M23's resurgence was initially the strained relationship between the Ugandan and Rwandan governments. In 2021, Kinshasa and Kampala established economic and security partnerships. This led Kigali to feel that it was marginalized in the region and that its interests were threatened. This sense of isolation was one of the main drivers behind its support for the M23.

Contrary to the Rwandan government's and the M23's narrative that the rebellion emerged in response to the Congolese government's support for the FDLR and violence and discrimination against Tutsis, our report suggests that these dynamics are more consequences than causes of the M23's resurgence. There is little evidence of an upsurge in anti-Tutsi violence in North Kivu prior to the resurgence of the M23.

In addition, the M23's rise to power reinforced these ethnic tensions and discriminations more than it prevented them.

Secondly, the weakness of the Congolese state has exacerbated the crisis. Faced with military pressure from the M23 and the Rwandan army, the Forces armées de la RDC (FARDC) were unable to bring the situation under control. The Congolese government resorted to private security contractors and collaborated with foreign and local armed groups. Yet these latter groups - like the M23 - recruit mainly on an ethnic basis, aggravating community and regional tensions.

On the diplomatic front, the Nairobi process was confronted with a fundamental contradiction between the interests of the participating states. While the Luanda process, driven by the African Union, has recently achieved a ceasefire, it has made little progress towards a lasting resolution of the crisis for the time being.

Although the Congolese government has recently proposed a plan to dismantle the FDLR as part of the Luanda process, which is necessary, our report suggests that this is unlikely to be enough to end the crisis.

Our study also finds that, although all major donors have come to condemn Rwanda for its support of the M23, Rwanda's position on the international stage has been little affected by its involvement. So far, Kigali has not suffered any material consequences. Rwanda's military power, which has enabled it to become an important ally of the West and a key player in UN peacekeeping, is certainly among the reasons for this indulgence.

Given Rwanda's role in this crisis, increased pressure, particularly financial pressure, is the most obvious first step to remedying the situation. On the Congolese side, reform of the security sector is particularly imperative. The government must transform the FARDC, which is largely used to distribute privileges and extract resources, into a genuine public service.

Read the full report here.